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SELECTED PROCUREMENT PERSPECTIVES :AN OVERVIEW 
• TOPIC 1- OBJECTIVES  
• TOPIC 2- PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT 
IN PROCUREMENT 
• TOPIC 3- WHEN CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE 
UNSATISFACTORY OR QUESTIONABLE
• TOPIC 4- DETERMINING THE EFFECT OR IMPACT OF CONTRACTOR NON-
PERFORMANCE
• TOPIC 5- WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED 
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SELECTED PROCUREMENT PERSPECTIVES :AN OVERVIEW 
DISCUSSION TOPIC 1- OBJECTIVES  
TO SHARE EXPERIENCE OVERSEEING PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES TO HELP 
ASSURE THAT:
 VALUE FOR MONEY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IS ACHIEVED
 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND VENDORS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE
 GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS ARE ALSO HELD ACCOUNTABLE
 PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS ARE FULLY TRANSPARENT 
 PROCUREMENT PROCESSES-FROM NEEDS DETERMINATION TO 
CONTRACTOR AND VENDOR PERFORMANCE- ARE EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT 
AND ECONOMICAL
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SELECTED PROCUREMENT PERSPECTIVES :AN OVERVIEW 
DISCUSSION TOPIC 1- OBJECTIVES  
TO ASSIST THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERSEEING GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES TO:
– DISCHARGE THEIR OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES,
– TO STRENGTHEN THAT OVERSIGHT WHERE APPROPRIATE, 
– CREATE AND ENHANCE OPPORTUNITIES TO HELP MAXIMIZE THE VALUE 
FOR MONEY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, 
– PREVENT, DETECT, INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE FRAUD, AND
– CURTAIL WASTE AND ABUSE. 
- 5 -
DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN 
PROCUREMENT 
DISCUSSION PARAMETERS: CAN AND SHOULD GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND VENDORS 
BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE? 
WHAT ABOUT PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS? SHOULD THEY BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE? 
MUST THEIR ACTIVITIES BE TRANSPARENT? 




PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN 
PROCUREMENT 
WHAT IS PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY?
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY - REQUIRES ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL 
GOVERNMENT DECISIONS.  
 REQUIRES THE ASSIGNMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVERY
DECISION, ACTIVITY, PROGRAM, AND PROCUREMENT, TO ASSURE THE ELECTORATE 
THAT THESE ACTIVITIES AND THE RESOURCES SPENT ON THEM ARE IN THEIR 
INTEREST AND IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST.   
 ACCOUNTABILITY MUST BE INTERWOVEN THROUGHOUT THE GOVERNMENT’S 
ENTIRE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, MOST ESPECIALLY IN THE PROCUREMENT 
SYSTEM. 
- 7 -
DISCUSSION TOPIC 2 
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN 
PROCUREMENT 
PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTABILITY
THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IS THAT THE USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS AND 
THE STEWARDSHIP OVER PUBLIC RESOURCES CARRIES WITH IT A RESPONSIBILITY TO :
 ANSWER TO THE COMMUNITY FOR THE USE OF THOSE FUNDS, AND 
 HOW THOSE PUBLIC RESOURCES ARE BEING EMPLOYED. 
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, THE POWER ASSUMED BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS IS DERIVED FROM 
THE CITIZENRY. 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE OBLIGED TO JUSTIFY HOW AND WHY THEY APPROPRIATE AND USE 
PUBLIC RESOURCES.  
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN 
PROCUREMENT 
VALDECK, BULLEN, AND ROSENBAUM AND ACCOUNTABILITY: FORMAL VERSUS 
SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY
FORMAL ACCOUNTABILITY IS DEFINED AS BEING HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR:
 FOLLOWING PROCEDURES, 
 MEETING REQUIREMENTS, AND 
 ADHERING TO REGULATIONS. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT 
IN PROCUREMENT 
FORMAL ACCOUNTABILITY IS IN EVIDENCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR BY STRICT 
ADHERENCE TO ESTABLISHED RULES AND REGULATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE:
• WHETHER OR NOT A REQUIRED GOVERNMENT FORM IS AVAILABLE, 
• WHETHER OR NOT IT IS CORRECTLY COMPLETED, OR 
• WHETHER OR NOT IT IS SUBMITTED ON TIME. 
FORMAL ACCOUNTABILITY IS ADHERENCE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS, REGARDLESS 
OF WHETHER THEY ARE ACCOMPLISHING THEIR INTENDED  PURPOSES, OR WORSE YET, 
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE CLEARLY IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN 
PROCUREMENT 
SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY IS  BEING FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ONE'S ACTIONS AND 
FOR THE RESULTS OF THOSE ACTIONS.  IT GOES BEYOND FORMAL ACCOUNTABILITY.
IF A RULE OR REGULATION IS NOT ACCOMPLISHING ITS INTENDED PURPOSES, OR  ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC, A 
PUBLIC OFFICIAL MUST BE HELD SUBSTANTIVELY ACCOUNTABLE. 
HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR HAVING CREATED THE RULE OR REGULATION, HELD 
ACCOUNTABLE FOR NOT RECOGNIZING ITS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IMPACT, AND HELD 
ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE ILL-CONCEIVED RULE OR 
REGULATION.     
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN 
PROCUREMENT 
IN SUMMARY:
FORMAL ACCOUNTABILITY HOLDS PUBLIC OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE FOR INITIATING 
AND IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC PROGRAMS. IT DOES NOT HOLD THEM ACCOUNTABLE FOR 
THE OUTCOME OF THOSE PROGRAMS, WHETHER THESE PROGRAM ARE EFFECTIVE. 
SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY HOLDS PUBLIC OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR 
ACTIONS IN INITIATING SUCH PROGRAMS, AND FOR PROGRAM OUTCOME AND 
PROGRAM RESULTS. 
ULTIMATELY, ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR SHOULD BE ABOUT TAKING 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ONE'S ACTIONS, OR WHAT ONE 
DOES AND DOES NOT DO.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN 
PROCUREMENT 
THE LEDIVINA V. CARINO ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL DEFINES FIVE COMPONENTS OF 
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY.  
1. TRADITIONAL. THE REGULARITY OF FISCAL TRANSACTIONS AND COMPLIANCE 
WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES. 
2. MANAGERIAL THE EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY WITH WHICH PUBLIC 
RESOURCES ARE USED.
3. PROGRAM. THE RESULTS OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND PROGRAMS.
4. SOCIAL. WHETHER THE ACTIVITIES INSPIRE GENERAL CONFIDENCE AND 
SECURE WHAT IS REGARDED AS DESIRABLE SOCIAL ENDS.  
5. PROCESS.  EMPHASIZES PROCEDURES AND METHODS OF OPERATION AND 
FOCUSES ON SYSTEMS WHICH TRANSFORM IN-PUTS INTO OUT-PUTS. 
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VALDECK-BULLEN-ROSENBAUM MODEL
Formal Accountability Accountable for following procedures, meeting requirements, 
and adhering to regulations 
Substantive Accountability Accountable for actions and the results of those actions
CARINO MODEL
Traditional Accountability Accountable for the regularity of fiscal transactions and the 
compliance and adherence to legal requirements and 
administrative policies
Managerial Accountability Accountable for the efficiency and economy with which public 
funds, property, manpower, and other resources are used
Program Accountability Accountable for the results of government operations and 
programs
Social Accountability Accountable for assuring that the activities inspire general 
confidence and secure what is regarded as desirable social 
ends 
Process Accountability Accountable for the procedures and the methods of operation, 
focusing on systems which transform in-puts into out-puts
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY & 
OVERSIGHT IN PROCUREMENT 
Discuss: What genre of accountability is best suited for the procurement process in 
Tanzania?
Discuss: How can accountability in Tanzania’s procurement system be 
strengthened? 
Discuss: The United Republic of Tanzania spends billions of shillings a year on 
procurement. Who is accountable for those billions?  
- 15 -
DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN 
PROCUREMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY  IS MOOT IF THERE IS NO TRANSPARENCY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT 
TRANSPARENCY.  GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL CAN NOT BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE IF THERE 
IS NO WAY TO LOOK AT THEIR DECISIONS, OR EXAMINING THEIR ACTIVITIES ESPECIALLY 
IF:
• LEGISLATION PROHIBITS THE EXAMINATION OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 
ACTIVITIES OR RULES AND REGULATIONS FORBID ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS.  
• SYSTEMS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER GOVERNMENT MANAGERS MEET 
PROGRAM AND FINANCIAL GOALS AND EXPECTATIONS ARE COMPLICATED, 
CUMBERSOME OR NON-EXISTENT. 
• PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES FOR EXAMINING PROCUREMENT ACTIONS ARE 
AMBIGUOUS. 
• POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXAMINATION, REVIEW, 
ASSESSMENT OR SCRUTINY OF ALL ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTOR AND GOVERNMENT VENDOR PERFORMANCE.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY 
AND OVERSIGHT IN PROCUREMENT 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ARE OFTEN USED AS THOUGH THEY WERE 
SYNONYMOUS. THEY ARE QUITE DIFFERENT IN MEANING. 
• ACCOUNTABILITY MEANS HAVING TO ACCOUNT FOR OR BE RESPONSIBLE FOR  
ONE'S ACTIONS OR INACTIONS. 
• TRANSPARENCY MEANS BEING ABLE TO SEE CLEARLY  THROUGH AN OBJECT, 
IMPLYING  QUALITIES OR FEATURES THAT ALLOW ONE TO SEE PLAINLY INTO THE 
ACTIVITIES OR OPERATIONS OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS OR ACTIVITIES LIKE A 
PROCUREMENT. 
IT MEANS THERE ARE NO IMPEDIMENTS INTERFERING WITH AN EXAMINATION OF HOW 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE CARRYING OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY 
AND OVERSIGHT IN PROCUREMENT 
LACK OF PUBLIC SECTOR TRANSPARENCY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO 
CORRUPTION
THE ABSENCE OF TRANSPARENCY PRECLUDES OR PREVENTS THE SCRUTINY OF THE 
ACTIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS, CREATING A CLIMATE CONDUCIVE TO OFFICIAL 
CORRUPTION.  
IT PRODUCES AN ENVIRONMENT THAT CAN LEAD PUBLIC OFFICIALS TO DISREGARD 
OR OTHERWISE BETRAY THE PUBLIC TRUST. 
CORRUPTION, ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, CAN HAVE A 
MEASURABLE IMPACT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. 
ACCORDING TO AN ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK OFFICIAL, "...CORRUPTION COULD 
ADD MAYBE 20-100 PERCENT TO THE COST OF GOODS OF PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS 




PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY
AND OVERSIGHT IN PROCUREMENT 
Discuss: The United Republic of Tanzania spends billions of shillings a year 
on procurement, how transparent are its procurement activities? 




PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN 
PROCUREMENT 
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIRES OVERSIGHT SYSTEMS.  
 OVERSIGHT HELPS ASSURE ACCOUNTABILITY. 
 ACCOUNTABILITY DOESN’T HAPPEN WITHOUT OVERSIGHT.
INDEPENDENT, OBJECTIVE OVERSIGHT IS THE CAPSTONE OF THE 





PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN 
PROCUREMENT 
PERSPECTIVES ON OVERSIGHT 
 OVERSIGHT IS THE ACT OF VIEWING BROADLY FROM A DISTANCE.
WATCHING OVER THE WORK AND PERFORMANCE OF OTHERS.  
ACCOUNTABILITY CAN BE MANDATED AND TRANSPARENCY CAN BE ENCOURAGED; 
BOTH CAN BE LEGISLATED:  
BOTH MUST BE COMPLEMENTED WITH A SYSTEMATIC, WELL ORGANIZED 
OVERSIGHT PROCESS WHICH ALLOWS FOR ROUTINELY AND OBJECTIVELY 
MONITORING AND ASSESSING PUBLIC SECTOR ACTIVITIES   
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY 
AND OVERSIGHT IN PROCUREMENT 
A WELL DEVELOPED SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT IS REQUISITE FOR DETERMINING 
THE DEGREE TO WHICH PROGRAMS, PLANS AND ACTIVITIES, INTENDED TO 
ACCOMPLISH GOVERNMENTAL OBJECTIVES ARE BEING:  
• DILIGENTLY PURSUED,
• ACCOMPLISHING WHAT THEY ARE INTENDED TO ACCOMPLISH IN AN 
EFFICIENT, ECONOMICALLY MANNER, 
• EFFECTIVE IN SERVING THE PUBLIC INTERESTS, AND 
• ACCURATELY ACCOUNTED FOR. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY 
AND OVERSIGHT IN PROCUREMENT 
OVERSIGHT IS NOT :
• DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORK BEING PERFORMED, NOR 
• EVER INCLUDE DIRECTING THAT WORK. 
OVERSIGHT IS: 
THE ACT OF OBJECTIVELY AND INDEPENDENTLY EXAMINING,
THE STATEMENTS AND REPRESENTATIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY    
PREPARED BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND OTHERS,
ABOUT THE USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES, 
FACILITATED BY THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY 
SYSTEM. 
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ACCOUNTABILITY PUBLIC OFFICIALS MUST  ACCOUNT TO THE PUBLIC FOR INITIATING  AND 
CARRYING OUT PUBLICLY FUNDED PROCUREMENTS. 
TRANSPARENCY PUBLIC OFFICIALS MUST DEVELOP, LEGISLATE, AND FACILITATE 
GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS, PROCESSES, AND PROCEDURES, TO ALLOW 
PROCUREMENT DECISIONS , THE REASONS FOR THE DECISIONS, AND 
THE OUTCOME OF THE DECISIONS  TO BE READILY AVAILABLE FOR 
EXAMINATION, AND  THE EXAMINATION RESULTS BE MADE PUBLIC. 
OVERSIGHT A  SYSTEM MUST BE ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED WHICH PERMITS 
THE  INDEPENDENT EXAMINATION  OF  STATEMENTS AND 
REPRESENTATIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY BY A LEGITIMATELY 
ESTABLISHED OVERSIGHT BODY .
DISCUSSION TOPIC 2
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN PROCUREMENT 
A SYNOPSIS OF PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND OVERSIGHT
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PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND OVERSIGHT IN PROCUREMENT 
RECENT LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES: THE DATA ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ACT 
(DATA ACT) 2014 INCREASES GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY. 
 OVERHAULS THE WAY FEDERAL 
SPENDING DATA IS MANAGED AND 
PUBLICLY PRESENTED. 
 HOLDS AGENCIES ACCOUNTABLE FOR 
WASTE, FRAUD AND MISMANAGEMENT.
 FORCES AGENCIES TO ADOPT COMMON 
STANDARDS TO TRACK AND REPORT 
CONTRACT SPENDING. 
 ALLOWS SPENDING DATA TO BE 
DOWNLOADED, SEARCHED, SO IT CAN 
BE   DETERMINED  HOW FUNDS ARE 
BEING SPENT AND WHO IS 
BENEFITING.  
 IMPROVES THE ACCURACY AND 
THOROUGHNESS OF THE DATA 
AGENCIES REPORT. 
 PERMITS AGENCIES TO PINPOINT 
OPPORTUNITIES TO  CUT WASTE, 




WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
DISCUSSION PARAMETERS: 
WHEN CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE 
UNSATISFACTORY OR QUESTIONABLE WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
CAN A PROCUREMENT ACTION BE CANCELLED WHEN WRONGDOING IS 
ESTABLISHED? 
WHAT ABOUT GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS?
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
EVEN WITH A GOOD SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND 
OVERSIGHT, UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE BY CONTRACTORS, VENDORS AND 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS IS CERTAIN TO OCCUR.   
IF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF ANY ASPECT OF A PROCUREMENT IS 
IDENTIFIED BY AN OVERSIGHT BODY THE:
CAUSE MUST ALWAYS BE DETERMINED,  
EFFECT OR IMPACT MUST ALWAYS BE ESTABLISHED,, AND 
AVAILABLE LEGAL AND STATUTORY REMEDIES MUST BE CONSIDERED
REMEMBER: WHEN IT IS PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS AND PERSONNEL THAT ARE 




WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
THERE ARE ESSENTIALLY TWO PRIMARY REASONS OR CAUSES FOR CONTRACTOR, OR 
VENDOR NON-PERFORMANCE OR UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE:
• PROCUREMENT SYSTEM DEFICIENCIES AND THE POSSIBLE CONTRACTOR 
SHORTCOMINGS THAT FLOW FROM OR ARE ENABLED BY THESE DEFICIENCIES 
THAT… 
o MUST BE CORRECTED
• FRAUD BY THE CONTRACTOR, VENDOR, PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS, OR OTHERS, 
INCLUDING POLITICAL INFLUENCE, THAT…
o MUST BE REPORTED. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
WHEN UNSATISFACTORY OR NON-PERFORMANCE IS IDENTIFIED BY AN OVERSIGHT 
BODY, THE SPECIFIC REASONS IT OCCURRED MUST BE DETERMINED SO:
 RECOMMENDATIONS TO MANAGEMENT FOR IMPROVED PERFORMANCE IN 
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION




• MAKE A REFERRAL TO AUTHORITIES BECAUSE OF SUSPECTED FRAUD.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
THE CAUSE OF NON-PERFORMANCE IS THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACTORS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN… 
 THE SITUATION THAT EXISTS, E.G., THE FAILURE TO DELIVER AS REQUIRED, E.G., 
ERRONEOUS BILLING, OR THE SELECTION OF AN UNQUALIFIED BIDDER, AND 
 THE REQUIRED COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONTRACT, PURCHASE ORDER,  THE LAW, 
POLICY, AND OR REGULATIONS. 
THE DETERMINATION OF CAUSE IS THE BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS, MODIFIED POLICIES, LEGISLATION, OR OTHER ACTIONS. 
IDENTIFYING THE CAUSE OF NON-PERFORMANCE HELPS THE OVERSIGHT  
OFFICIALS DEVELOP CONSTRUCTIVE, CORRECTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS.  
SUSPECTED FRAUD IS ALSO A CONSIDERATION AS THE POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR 
CONTRACTOR OR VENDOR NON-PERFORMANCE.   
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
RECOMMENDATIONS TO AGENCY OFFICIALS  AND REFERRALS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES BY OVERSIGHT BODIES ARE MORE PERSUASIVE IF THEY:
--ARE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE,
--REFLECT CLEAR AND CONVINCING REASONING,
--INCLUDE THE LINK BETWEEN THE PROBLEMS AND THE FACTOR OR FACTORS 
IDENTIFIED AS THE CAUSE, AND 
--CLEARLY LINKED WITH EFFECT OR IMPACT.
OVERSIGHT  OFFICIALS MAY IDENTIFY:
DEFICIENCIES IN PROGRAM DESIGN CAUSING  POOR PERFORMANCE. 
DEFICIENCIES IN INTERNAL CONTROLS CAUSING DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE.
EVIDENCE THAT INDICATES THAT FRAUD MAY HAVE TAKEN PLACE. 
ASSUMING APPROPRIATE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, INTERVENTION BY AN OVERSIGHT 
BODY OR BODIES IS ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY WHEN A PROCUREMENT DECISION IS 
QUESTIONABLE…E.G.,  REJECTING A TENDER.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
ILLUSTRATIONS-EXAMPLES OF OVERSIGHT DETERMINATIONS 
SELECT AND DISCUSS CAUSE FROM THE FOLLOWING  OVERSIGHT DETERMINATIONS
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
CASE #1  OVERSIGHT DETERMINATION: SERVICES WERE CONTRACTED FOR THAT WERE NOT 
NEEDED AND IN EXCESS OF WHAT MAY BE REQUIRED IN THE FUTURE. 
CASE #2  OVERSIGHT DETERMINATION:   OUTPUT AND INPUT REQUIREMENTS APPEARED TO 
JUSTIFY CONTRACTING WITH ONLY CERTAIN CONTRACTORS AND VENDORS. THEY WERE 
DEFINED IN SUCH A WAY SO ONLY CERTAIN CONTRACTORS OR VENDORS COULD SUPPLY 
THEM. 
CASE #3  OVERSIGHT DETERMINATION: NEEDS ASSESSMENTS WERE NOT ADEQUATELY OR 
ACCURATELY DEVELOPED.
CASE #4  OVERSIGHT DETERMINATION: A CONTRACTOR,  RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE 
QUALITY OF THE WORK, SUBMITTED DATA ON RESULTS FROM ACCEPTABLE WORK  WHEN  
UNACCEPTABLE TOLERANCES WERE  FOUND INSTEAD OF REDOING THE FAULTY WORK. 
CASE #5  OVERSIGHT DETERMINATION: STATEMENTS OF WORK WERE UNCLEAR, POORLY 
WRITTEN, AND VAGUE. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN THE EVENT OF 





TERMINATION, SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT ACTIONS PROTECT THE 
GOVERNMENT FROM DOING BUSINESS WITH INDIVIDUALS AND 
COMPANIES WHO POSE A BUSINESS RISK TO THE GOVERNMENT, 
INCLUDING VIOLATING FEDERAL LAW.  
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT AND FOR CONVENIENCE  
TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT
PROCUREMENT CAN BE TERMINATED WHEN WRONGDOING IS ESTABLISHED. 
TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT FOR DEFAULT HOLDS A CONTRACTOR AT 
FAULT DUE TO AN ACTUAL OR ANTICIPATED FAILURE TO PERFORM 




WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT FOR CONVENIENCE
TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT FOR CONVENIENCE DOES NOT HOLD A 
CONTRACTOR AT FAULT. 
THE GOVERNMENT CAN TERMINATE FOR CONVENIENCE IF IN ITS BEST 
INTEREST, E.G., DUE TO REQUIREMENT CHANGES OR INSUFFICIENT 
FUNDS. 
THIS DECISION IS TAKEN ONLY AFTER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION 
BECAUSE IT IS POTENTIALLY COSTLY. 
EVERY GOVERNMENT CONTRACT SHOULD CONTAIN A "TERMINATION 
FOR CONVENIENCE" CLAUSE. THE CLAUSE PERMITS THE 
GOVERNMENT TO TERMINATE A CONTRACT, AT ANY TIME, WITHOUT 
CAUSE, WHEN IN "THE GOVERNMENT'S BEST INTEREST.” 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
TERMINATION  FOR DEFAULT - GENERALLY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS PROVIDE 
THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY CANCEL  A CONTRACT IF THE CONTRACTOR, AMONG 
OTHER ACTIONS, FAILS TO:
• MAKE DELIVERY WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THE CONTRACT,
• MAKE PROGRESS SO AS TO ENDANGER PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT, 
AND/OR
• PERFORM ANY PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
TERMINATION  FOR CONVENIENCE - A CONTRACT IS TERMINATED FOR CONVENIENCE BY THE 
ISSUANCE OF A WRITTEN NOTICE OF TERMINATION BY THE CONTRACTING OFFICIAL. 
THIS NOTICE MUST CONTAIN INFORMATION INCLUDING: 
• A STATEMENT THAT THE CONTRACT IS BEING TERMINATED FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF THE 
GOVERNMENT; 
• THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF TERMINATION;
• ANY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS; AND 
• THE STEPS THE CONTRACTOR MUST TAKE TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT ON PERSONNEL.
BEFORE TERMINATING A CONTRACT, GENERALLY, THE CONTRACTING OFFICIAL WILL GIVE THE 
CONTRACTOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO REMEDY DEFECTS IN PERFORMANCE OR 
SHOW WHY THE CONTRACT SHOULD NOT BE TERMINATED.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
SUSPENSION- THE TEMPORARY DISQUALIFICATION OF A COMPANY OR 
INDIVIDUALS FROM CONTRACTING WITH THE GOVERNMENT FOR UP TO 18 
MONTHS. 
SUSPENSIONS REST ON SUSPICION OR AN INDICTMENT, RATHER THAN FINAL 
ADJUDICATION OR CONVICTION. 
IT IS A SERIOUS ACTION AND GENERALLY INCLUDES THESE THREE ELEMENTS:
1. IMPOSED ON THE BASIS OF ADEQUATE EVIDENCE, 
2. PENDING THE COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION OR LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, 
3. WHEN IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION IS NECESSARY 
TO PROTECT THE GOVERNMENT’S INTEREST. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
SUSPENSION- IN ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF THE EVIDENCE SURROUNDING A 
CONTEMPLATED SUSPENSION, CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO:
• HOW MUCH INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE, 
• THE CREDIBILITY  OF THE INFORMATION IS ,  
• WHETHER IMPORTANT ALLEGATIONS CAN  BE  CORROBORATED, AND 
• WHAT INFERENCES CAN REASONABLY BE DRAWN AS A RESULT. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
SUSPENSION- A NOTICE OF SUSPENSION WILL STATE :
THE REASONS FOR THE SUSPENSION, 
ANY CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUIRED OF THE CONTRACTOR, AND 
THE EFFECTIVE DATE. 
SUSPENSIONS GENERALLY REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL:
THE CONTRACTOR HAS TAKEN CORRECTIVE ACTION SATISFACTORY TO THE 
CONTRACTING AGENCY, OR
GIVEN EVIDENCE SATISFACTORY TO THE CONTRACTING AGENCY THAT SUCH 
CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN, OR
 UNTIL THE CONTRACTING AGENCY TERMINATES THE CONTRACT.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
DEBARMENT - A DEBARMENT DECISION IS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT WHEN IT 
IS DECIDED THAT, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, A CONTRACTOR SHOULD BE 
DEBARRED…PREVENTED FROM DOING BUSINESS WITH THE GOVERNMENT.  
A DEBARMENT CONSTITUTES DEBARMENT OF ALL DIVISIONS OR OTHER 
ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS OF THE CONTRACTOR, UNLESS THE DEBARMENT 
DECISION IS LIMITED BY ITS TERMS TO SPECIFIC DIVISIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL 
ELEMENTS, OR COMMODITIES.  
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
DEBARMENT- THE DEBARRING OFFICIAL, GENERALLY LEGISLATIVELY  OR 
STATUTORILY SPECIFIED , MAY EXTEND THE DEBARMENT DECISION TO INCLUDE ANY 
AFFILIATES OF THE CONTRACTOR IF THEY ARE:
•SPECIFICALLY NAMED, AND 
•GIVEN WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE PROPOSED DEBARMENT AND AN 
OPPORTUNITY  TO RESPOND.
A CONTRACTOR'S DEBARMENT CAN BE EFFECTIVE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE
GOVERNMENT, UNLESS AN ACQUIRING AGENCY'S HEAD OR A DESIGNEE STATES IN 
WRITING THE COMPELLING REASONS JUSTIFYING CONTINUED BUSINESS 
DEALINGS BETWEEN THAT AGENCY AND THE CONTRACTOR.
- 43 -
DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
DEBARMENT- THE DEBARRING OFFICIAL MAY DEBAR A CONTRACTOR 
INVOLVED IN A CONVICTION OF, OR CIVIL JUDGMENT FOR THE COMMISSION 
OF FRAUD OR A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
DEBARMENT - GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT INCLUDE: 
• COMMISSION OF FRAUD OR A CRIMINAL OFFENSE IN CONNECTION WITH A 
PUBLIC CONTRACT OR SUBCONTRACT; 
• VIOLATION OF STATUTES RELATING TO THE SUBMISSION OF OFFERS; 
• COMMISSION OF EMBEZZLEMENT, THEFT, FORGERY AND RELATED CRIMES,  
• COMMISSION OF AN UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE;
• VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF A CONTRACT OR SUBCONTRACT SO SERIOUS 
AS TO JUSTIFY DEBARMENT;                                          NEXT                                                       
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
DEBARMENT
GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT INCLUDE: 
• COMMISSION OF ANY OTHER OFFENSE INDICATING A LACK OF 
BUSINESS INTEGRITY OR BUSINESS HONESTY THAT SERIOUSLY 
AND DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE PRESENT RESPONSIBILITY OF A 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR;, AND 
• ANY OTHER CAUSE OF SO SERIOUS OR COMPELLING A NATURE 
THAT IT AFFECTS THE PRESENT RESPONSIBILITY OF A 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 3
WHEN PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE UNSATISFACTORY
DEBARMENT- CONTRACTING OFFICIALS GENERALLY ARE NOT PERMITTED TO SOLICIT 
OFFERS FROM, AWARD CONTRACTS TO, OR CONSENT TO SUBCONTRACTS WITH 
SUSPENDED OR DEBARRED CONTRACTORS. 
IN THE UNITED STATES, SUSPENDED OR DEBARRED CONTRACTORS ARE PLACED ON THE 
"LIST OF PARTIES EXCLUDED FROM FEDERAL PROCUREMENT AND NON-PROCUREMENT 
PROGRAMS." GOVERNMENT AGENCIES CANNOT DO BUSINESS WITH COMPANIES ON THE 
LIST. 
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EACH LIST INCLUDES SUCH INFORMATION AS: 
• NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CONTRACTORS DEBARRED AND SUSPENDED, 
WITH CROSS- REFERENCES WHEN MORE THAN ONE NAME IS INVOLVED IN A 
SINGLE ACTION; 
• NAME OF THE AGENCY OR OTHER AUTHORITY TAKING THE ACTION; 
• CAUSE FOR THE ACTION; 
• EFFECT OF THE ACTION; AND
• TERMINATION DATE FOR EACH LISTING.
DISCUSSION TOPIC 3




DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OR IMPACT OF NON-PERFORMANCE OF 
CONTRACTS AND OTHER PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES
DISCUSSION PARAMETERS: 
DETERMINING THE EFFECT OR IMPACT OF CONTRACTOR NON-
PERFORMANCE. 
HOW IS IMPACT DETERMINED? 
HOW IS IT MEASURED?
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 4
DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OR IMPACT OF NON-PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS 
AND OTHER PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES
WHAT IS THE EFFECT OR THE IMPACT OF NON-PERFORMANCE?
THE HARM CAUSED BY PERFORMANCE FAILURES, AND OTHER NON-COMPLIANCE 
SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED. 
EFFECT IS THE CONSEQUENCE OR IMPACT (HARM) RESULTING WHEN CONDITIONS 
DIFFER FROM CRITERIA. 
IT IS THE CLEAR, LOGICAL LINK ESTABLISHING THE IMPACT OR POTENTIAL IMPACT OF 




DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OR IMPACT OF NON-PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS 
AND OTHER PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES
NON-PERFORMANCE GENERALLY RESULTS IN AN IMPACT OR EFFECT
 IN OVERSEEING THE EXECUTION OF A CONTRACT, THE PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT 
ESTABLISHES THE CRITERIA, INCLUDING THE APPLICABLE LAWS, AND THE POLICIES, 
AND PROCEDURES THAT GOVERN THE CONTRACT, E.G., TERMS AND CONDITIONS. 
 WHEN OVERSIGHT DISCLOSES THAT THE CRITERIA, THE APPLICABLE LAWS, 
POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES THAT GOVERN THE CONTRACT OR PURCHASE ORDER 
AND/OR THE CONTRACT OR PURCHASE ORDER AGREEMENT ITSELF, HAVE NOT BEEN 
ADHERED TO, THE IMPACT OF THIS FAILURE MUST BE DETERMINED.   
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 4
DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OR IMPACT OF NON-PERFORMANCE OF 
CONTRACTS AND OTHER PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES
DETERMINING THE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-PERFORMANCE ON THE PART OF A 
CONTRACT OFFICIAL, A CONTRACTOR OR A VENDOR CONFIRMS MATERIALITY. 
THE EFFECT OR POTENTIAL EFFECT IDENTIFIES THE OUTCOMES OR CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE CONDITION, SPECIFICALLY THE FAILURE TO ADHERE TO THE CRITERIA.
OVERSIGHT PROTOCOL MAY  INCLUDE IDENTIFYING THE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF A CONDITION THAT VARIES (EITHER POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVELY) 
FROM THE CRITERIA. “EFFECT" IS A MEASURE OF THOSE CONSEQUENCES. 
EFFECT OR POTENTIAL EFFECT MAY BE USED TO DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR 
CORRECTIVE ACTION IN RESPONSE TO IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS OR RELEVANT RISKS. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 4
DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OR IMPACT OF NON-PERFORMANCE OF 
CONTRACTS AND OTHER PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES
OVERSIGHT PROTOCOLS SHOULD INCLUDE ESTIMATING THE EXTENT TO WHICH NON-
PERFORMANCE  HAS CAUSED UNWANTED/UNEXPECTED/UNDESIRABLE, CHANGES IN 
PHYSICAL, SOCIAL, OR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS.
EFFECT OR   IMPACT CAUSED   BY CONTRACT FAILURE  IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH 
POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE CHANGES IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL, SOCIAL, OR ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS CAN BE IDENTIFIED AND ATTRIBUTED TO THE CONTRACT FAILURE.
- 53 -
DISCUSSION TOPIC 4
DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OR IMPACT OF NON-PERFORMANCE OF 
CONTRACTS AND OTHER PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES
CONSEQUENCES OR IMPACT OF NON-PERFORMANCE CAN GENERALLY 
BE EXPRESSED AS FOLLOWS: 
• QUANTITATIVELY, APPROXIMATED OR PROJECTED AND 
ARTICULATED IN NUMERICAL AND FINANCIAL TERMS, AND
• QUALITATIVELY AS IN THE LOSS OF HEALTH, SAFETY, ASSETS, 
SECURITY, AND IMPACT ON AN ENTITY’S MISSION.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 4
DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OR IMPACT OF NON-PERFORMANCE OF 
CONTRACTS AND OTHER PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES
SELECT AND DISCUSS IMPACT FROM THE FOLLOWING OVERSIGHT 
DETERMINATIONS
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#1 OVERSIGHT DETERMINATION - DELIVERY OF REQUIRED MATERIAL WAS NOT CHECKED TO ASSURE 
IT CONFORMED TO CONTRACT OR PURCHASE ORDER REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALITY, QUANTITY, AND 
TIMELY DELIVERY.
#2- OVERSIGHT DETERMINATION- MATERIAL CHANGES TO A CONTRACT WERE MADE AND WERE NOT 
SUBJECT TO A DOCUMENTED REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCESS.
#3- OVERSIGHT DETERMINATION- A PROCUREMENT DECISION DID NOT INCLUDE DOCUMENTATION TO 
SUPPORT A STUDY THAT AN ESTIMATED SEVERAL MILLIONS IN SAVINGS WOULD RESULT FROM THE 
PROCUREMENT FROM A SUPPLIER WHO WAS AWARDED A SOLE SOURCE CONTRACT.
#4- OVERSIGHT DETERMINATION -INVOICES WERE SUBMITTED BY A CONTRACTOR WHICH 
REPRESENTED THAT THE FIRMS’ EMPLOYEES WORKED CERTAIN HOURS ON COST-PLUS C
CONTRACTS WHEN IN FACT THEY WORKED ON FIXED PRICE CONTRACTS. 
#5- OVERSIGHT DETERMINATION- A CONTRACTOR,  WHO WAS AWARDED TWO CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS AND  WAS BEING CONSIDERED FOR A THIRD CONTRACT, FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY. 
DISCUSSION TOPIC 4
DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OR IMPACT OF NON-PERFORMANCE OF 
CONTRACTS AND OTHER PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
DISCUSSION PARAMETERS: 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED, HOW IS A REFERRAL FOR AN 
INVESTIGATION DETERMINED? 
WHO MAY CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION? IS LEGISLATED EMPOWERMENT 
REQUIRED? 
DOES OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY INCLUDE REFERRALS FOR FRAUD? 
WHAT IS REASONABLE SUSPICION AND PROBABLE CAUSE?
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
GENERAL
AN OVERSIGHT INQUIRY INTO ANY ACTIVITY, WHETHER A CONTRACT, OR PURCHASE 
ORDER MAY DISCLOSE EVIDENCE THAT INDICATES THE EXISTENCE OF POSSIBLE FRAUD. 
EACH OVERSIGHT UNIT MUST FOLLOW THE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED 
FOR REPORTING THAT DETERMINATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL APPLICABLE 
STANDARDS AND PREVAILING LAW. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
REPORTING SUSPECTED OR POSSIBLE FRAUD AFTER IT IS DETECTED AND DOCUMENTED
BASED ON AN EVIDENCE-BASED ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION, OVERSIGHT ORGANIZATIONS  ARE 
USUALLY DUTY BOUND  TO REPORT ALL POSSIBLE FRAUD AND ILLEGAL ACTS.  
WHEN IT IS CONCLUDED THAT FRAUD HAS  EITHER OCCURRED OR IS CURRENTLY TAKING PLACE, 
ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES MUST BE FOLLOWED AND ALL OTHER RELEVANT LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
TO PROCESS SUCH DISCLOSURES MUST BE COMPLIED WITH. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
TO REPORT PROBABLE FRAUD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE MUST BE COLLECTED 
TO CONCLUDE AS TO WHETHER POSSIBLE FRAUD  DOES EXIST. 
IN  COLLECTING THAT EVIDENCE,  OVERSIGHT OFFICIALS SHOULD FOCUS ON 
OBTAINING ANSWERS TO CERTAIN SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THESE ANSWERS WILL HELP  OFFICIALS CONCLUDE 
WHETHER POSSIBLE FRAUD EXISTS AND SHOULD BE REPORTED. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
A DEVELOPED DETERMINATION OF POSSIBLE FRAUD BY AN OVERSIGHT BODY MIGHT 
INCLUDE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT MANY OF THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:
• A REPRESENTATION IS MADE.
• THE  REPRESENTATION WAS FALSE. 
• THE  FALSE REPRESENTATION WAS MATERIAL.
• HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE REPRESENTATION'S FALSITY OR IGNORANCE OF ITS 
VALIDITY. 
• INTENDED THAT THE REPRESENTATION BE RELIED ON. 
• ALLOWED THE VICTIM TO BE IGNORANT OF THE FALSE REPRESENTATION.
• ALLOWED THE VICTIM TO RELY ON THE FALSE REPRESENTATION.
• WAS AWARE OF THE VICTIM’S RIGHT TO RELY ON THE REPRESENTATION. 
• CAUSED DAMAGE BY THE FALSE REPRESENTATION.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
THE REPORTING PROCESS WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED BY AN OVERSIGHT BODY, SPECIFIC PROCEDURES 
MUST BE ESTABLISHED AND  OBSERVED.
WHEN AN INDICATION OF AN ILLEGAL ACT OR ABUSE IS UNCOVERED IT MUST BE REFERRED 
TO COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.  
IF AN ACT IS DETERMINED TO WARRANT REFERRAL, THE APPROPRIATE ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCY SHOULD BE NOTIFIED.
IF A DECISION CANNOT BE IMMEDIATELY REACHED DUE TO THE NEED FOR MORE EVIDENCE , 
ADDITIONAL INQUIRIES REQUIRED TO ASSIST IN MAKING THE DECISION, SHOULD BE 
DETERMINED. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
REPORTING A POSSIBLE FRAUD:  SUGGESTED CONTENTS
 A DETAILED SUMMARY OR A SUMMARY REPORT SHOULD  BE 
PREPARED TO REPORT SUSPECTED FRAUD OR OTHER 
WRONGDOING. 
THE REPORT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY INDEXED TO RELEVANT 
DOCUMENTATION OR EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SUSPECTED 
FRAUD. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
REPORTING A POSSIBLE FRAUD: A SUGGESTED FORMAT AND CONTENT
THE REPORT CONTENT SHOULD INCLUDE:
 A DESCRIPTION OF THE POSSIBLE FRAUD DETAILING ALL RELEVANT AND PERTINENT 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE POSSIBLE FRAUD. 
THE LAWS, REGULATIONS, RULES, CONTRACT PROVISIONS, AND OTHER COVENANTS 
BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN BREACHED , AND 
 OTHER IMPROPER PRACTICES OR INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIORS THAT WERE KNOWN TO 
HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN OR CARRIED OUT. 
NEXT
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
REPORTING A POSSIBLE FRAUD: A SUGGESTED FORMAT AND CONTENT 
(ALSO SEE SLIDE 60)
 EVIDENCE THAT IMPROPER PRACTICES OR INAPPROPRIATE BEHAVIORS WERE 
CARRIED OUT, INCLUDING AT A MINIMUM EVIDENCE OF:   
o INTENT 
o A MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACTS
o RELIED ON BY OTHERS
o ACCOMPANIED BY WILLFUL DECEPTION 
o HARMFUL 
o BENEFICIAL TO AN INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS 
NEXT
- 65 -
DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
REPORTING A POSSIBLE FRAUD: A SUGGESTED FORMAT AND CONTENT 
 THE INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES THAT FAILED TO PREVENT 
OR DETECT THE POSSIBLE FRAUD, OR 
 THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE INTERNAL CONTROL BEING A 
PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE POSSIBLE 
FRAUD.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
REPORTING A POSSIBLE FRAUD: A SUGGESTED FORMAT (CONTINUED)
THE REPORT SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE: 
• MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS  AND OTHERS   BELIEVED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE POSSIBLE 
FRAUD.
• THE ECONOMIC VALUE OR OTHER QUANTIFIABLE FINANCIAL OR NON-FINANCIAL EFFECT OF THE 
FRAUD, INCLUDING DAMAGE TO THE ORGANIZATION, TO THE GOVERNMENT, TO BENEFICIARIES, 
TO STAKEHOLDERS, TO OTHER VICTIMS. 
• RECOMMENDATIONS, TO IMPROVE WEAKNESSES IN INTERNAL CONTROL AND/OR MANAGEMENT 
PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO PREVENT OR DETECT SIMILAR ACTS IN THE FUTURE, INCLUDING IF 
APPROPRIATE, SUGGESTIONS TO THE ASSEMBLY FOR LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS.
• ANY OTHER INFORMATION THAT WILL ADD VALUE TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSSIBLE 
FRAUD, AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
REPORTING A POSSIBLE FRAUD IS GENERALLY REQUIRED BY LAW AND STATUTE. 
PREVAILING LAW, REGULATION, OR OTHER RELATED POLICIES OFTEN REQUIRES 
OVERSIGHT ENTITIES  TO REPORT INDICATIONS OF FRAUD, ILLEGAL ACTS, AND VIOLATIONS 
OF PROVISIONS OF CONTRACTS TO AN INVESTIGATIVE BODY/LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
IMMEDIATELY UPON DISCLOSURE.
IN SOME CASES, IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO WORK WITH INVESTIGATORS AND/OR LEGAL 
AUTHORITIES, OR TO WITHDRAW FROM, OR DEFER FURTHER OVERSIGHT EFFORTS TO AVOID 
INTERFERING WITH THE INVESTIGATION OR LEGAL PROCEEDING.  
OVERSIGHT ENTITIES AND AGENCY MANAGEMENT MUST BE COMMITTED TO COOPERATION 
WITH ALL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, AND OTHER OVERSIGHT ORGANIZATIONS, INVESTIGATIVE 
BODIES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND PROSECUTORIAL ORGANIZATIONS.
REMEMBER: INTERFERENCE WITH INVESTIGATIONS OR LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MUST ALWAYS 
BE AVOIDED.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
SOME RELEVANT CRIMINAL FRAUD STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES
THERE ARE A VARIETY OF STATUTES THAT RELATE DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY TO CONTRACT FRAUD IN 
THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. 
WHAT FOLLOWS ARE REFERENCES TO SOME OF THE STATUTES RELEVANT TO CONTRACT AND VENDOR 
FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES. 
18 U.S.C. 1001 FALSE STATEMENTS OR ENTRIES
18 U.S.C. 286 CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD THE GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS
18 U.S.C. 287 FALSE, FICTITIOUS OR FRAUDULENT   CLAIMS
18 U.S.C. 666   THEFT OR BRIBERY CONCERNING PROGRAMS RECEIVING FEDERAL FUNDS
18 U.S.C 1341/1342/1343  MAIL/WIRE FRAUD
18 U.S.C. 1905 DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
31 U.S.C. 3729  FALSE CLAIMS
VIRTUALLY ALL CASES OF FRAUD INVOLVE VIOLATIONS OF MORE THAN ONE STATUTE.  
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
WHY A WRITTEN REPORT?
A WRITTEN REPORT:
• OFFICIALLY COMMUNICATES THE RESULTS OF THE INQUIRY TO RESPONSIBLE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS.
• MAKES OVERSIGHT INQUIRY RESULTS LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISUNDERSTANDING.
• FACILITATES FOLLOW UP BY THE OVERSIGHT BODY TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
RECOMMENDATIONS WERE ACTED ON.
• ENHANCES CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY.
• CONTRIBUTES TO THE HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE ACTIVITIES OF BOTH THE 
OVERSIGHT ORGANIZATION AND THE PROCURING ORGANIZATION.
- 70 -
DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
WHY A WRITTEN REPORT?
GENERALLY, A WRITTEN REPORT SERVES AS A MEDIUM FOR OFFICIALLY 
REQUESTING FEEDBACK, WITHIN A SPECIFIED TIMEFRAME (30 DAYS, 60 
DAYS, ETC.) FROM RESPONSIBLE PROCUREMENT OFFICIALS REGARDING 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED PERFORMANCE, SUGGESTED 
DISCIPLINARY MEASURES, OR ANY OTHER ACTION.
- 71 -
DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
CAN AN OVERSIGHT INQUIRY BE DISCONTINUED?
REGARDING THE OVERSIGHT OF A PROCUREMENT ACTIVITY WHICH OVERSIGHT EFFORTS 
ARE STARTED BUT TERMINATED PRIOR TO COMPLETION:
• THE REASONS FOR THE TERMINATION SHOULD BE DOCUMENTED AND A HISTORICAL 
RECORD RETAINED.
• REASONS FOR THE TERMINATED INQUIRY INITIATIVES SHOULD ALWAYS BE IN WRITING.
• THE REASONS FOR TERMINATION SHOULD ALWAYS BE ASSESSED. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
MAJOR REPORT COMPONENTS (REFER TO SLIDE 60)
GENERALLY, REPORTS COMMUNICATE BEST WHEN THEY CONTAIN CERTAIN VERY SPECIFIC 
INFORMATION AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED. THAT INFORMATION IS BEST REFLECTED IN THE FOLLOWING 
MAJOR REPORT SECTIONS:
INTRODUCTION
THE INTRODUCTION SECTION OF ALL REPORTS SHOULD INCLUDE INFORMATION THAT GIVES THE 
READER AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS EXAMINED AND WHY.  THE ISSUE OF REASONABLE 
SUSPICION SHOULD BE NOTED IN THIS SECTION.  
IT WOULD INCLUDE THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE ORGANIZATION, ITS MISSION, PERTINENT 
STATISTICAL INFORMATION, REFERENCES TO RELEVANT LAWS, LEGISLATION, AND POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES THAT BEAR ON THE ISSUE BEING EXAMINED. 
THE INTRODUCTION SECTION OF A REPORT SHOULD CONTAIN ALL OTHER DATA THAT WOULD BE 
USEFUL TO THE READER AND WHICH WOULD FACILITATE AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE REPORT
AND ITS MAIN MESSAGE.  
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
MAJOR REPORT COMPONENTS  (CONTINUED) 
OBJECTIVES
THE OBJECTIVES SECTION OF THE  REPORT DESCRIBES WHAT THE OVERSIGHT OF THE 
CONTRACT, PURCHASE ORDER, PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE  WAS INTENDED TO 
ACCOMPLISH OR QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED REGARDING THE PROBABILITY OF 
FRAUD. 
SCOPE 
THE SCOPE SECTION OF THE REPORT INFORMS THE REPORT READER ABOUT THE 
OVERSIGHT INQUIRY  AND THE METES AND BOUNDS OF THE INQUIRY. AND ITS FOCUS ON 
PROBABLE FRAUD.
IT DESCRIBES RECORDS EXAMINED, INDICATES THE PERIOD OF TIME COVERED 
BY THE INQUIRY, AND OTHER INFORMATION THAT FACILITATES AN
UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXTENT OF THE INQUIRY, INCLUDING ITS LIMITATIONS. 
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
MAJOR REPORT COMPONENTS  (CONTINUED) 
METHODOLOGY 
THE METHODOLOGY SECTION OF THE REPORT DISCUSSES THE SPECIFIC 
TECHNIQUES USED TO OBTAIN SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ACCOMPLISH THE 
INQUIRY’S OBJECTIVES AND CONFIRM THE POSSIBLE EXISTENCE OF FRAUD OR 
OTHER WRONGDOING. 
THE TECHNIQUES USED TO GATHER DATA AND ANALYZE THAT DATA ARE 
DESCRIBED AS WELL AS THE CRITERIA USED TO MAKE DETERMINATIONS AND 
DRAW CONCLUSIONS OF PROBABLE FRAUD.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
MAJOR REPORT COMPONENTS  (CONTINUED) 
CONCLUSIONS
THE CONCLUSION OF PROBABLE FRAUD SHOULD FLOW LOGICALLY AND CLEARLY FROM THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED.  THE EVIDENCE COLLECTED SHOULD COMPEL A CONCLUSION OF 
POSSIBLE FRAUD. 
NO NEW FACTS OR INFORMATION SHOULD BE INTRODUCED INTO THE CONCLUSIONS 
SECTION. 
EACH REPORTABLE ISSUE OF PROBABLE  FRAUD  REQUIRES ITS OWN CONCLUSION. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE REPORT SHOULD FLOW LOGICALLY AND CLEARLY FROM 
THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN.  
NO NEW FACTS OR NEW INFORMATION SHOULD BE INTRODUCED INTO THE 
RECOMMENDATION SECTION.
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DISCUSSION TOPIC 5 
WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED
COMMENTS OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS COMMENTS OF RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS ENHANCE THE 
OBJECTIVE NATURE OF THE REPORT. 
THE OVERSIGHT BODY MAY SOLICIT AND INCLUDE THE COMMENTS OF THOSE OFFICIALS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ISSUES BEING REPORTED DEPENDING ON THE CONCERNS OF THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ENTITY INVOLVED. 
COMMENTS, RELATIVE TO THE PROBABLE FRAUD MIGHT BE ACCURATELY AND FAIRLY 
INCORPORATED INTO THE REPORT. HOWEVER, ADVICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT  SHOULD BE 
FOLLOWED AS TO WHAT DETAILS MIGHT BE REPORTED AS REGARDS THE PROBABLE FRAUD.
RESPONSE TO OFFICIALS' COMMENTS 
WHERE APPLICABLE THE OVERSIGHT ORGANIZATION MUST FAIRLY AND OBJECTIVELY ASSESS THE 
COMMENTS OBTAINED FROM RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS AND INCLUDE THE RESULTS OF THAT 
ASSESSMENT  IN THE REPORT.
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OVERSIGHT OF PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES: SOME PERSPECTIVES
SUMMARY, QUESTIONS, COMMENTS, CONCERNS
 TOPIC 1-OBJECTIVES  
 TOPIC 2-PUBLIC SECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY AND 
OVERSIGHT IN PROCUREMENT 
 TOPIC 3-WHEN CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE IS DETERMINED TO BE 
UNSATISFACTORY OR QUESTIONABLE
 TOPIC 4-DETERMINING THE EFFECT OR IMPACT OF CONTRACTOR NON-
PERFORMANCE
 TOPIC 5-WHEN POSSIBLE FRAUD IS SUSPECTED 
